In this paper, I critically examine the long-debated concepts of truth and democracy within liberal academic and public discourse. The normalization of ‘alternative facts’ and disregard for longstanding democratic norms are just two of many examples that have raised urgent concerns about the future of truth and democracy. I begin with the premise that liberal political theory affirms certain minimal commitments regarding truth and democracy: truth is valued as a means by which to make sense of information so as to guide decision-making, with science, qua truth, understood as the product of an ongoing collective process. An essential function of democracy is its formal guarantee of free and equal political participation. With these commitments in mind, I identify a troubling response in current liberal defenses of truth and democracy: an implicit turn toward polarization and subtle authoritarianism. When deeply held political assumptions are perceived as under threat, some defenders narrow the field of acceptable discourse by consolidating epistemic and political legitimacy around certain institutions and actors, dismissing those who challenge their preferred prevailing frameworks and assumptions. I argue that this response contradicts core liberal democratic principles while exacerbating polarization and reproducing the very authoritarian tendencies it seeks to oppose.